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 Abstract— In this paper, we present an assessment of recent 
attacks on embedded systems, in particular mobile phones, 
wireless sensor networks, unmanned aerial vehicles and 
unmanned ground vehicles. As these systems become 
increasingly connected and networked, the number of 
attacks on them  increases exposing them to real threats and 
risks, particularly when used in mission critical applications. 
It is necessary to investigate all aspects of the security 
systems associated with embedded systems in order to help 
protect these systems from attackers. In this we present a 
survey on a number of embedded systems to show system 
vulnerabilities, recent attacks and the security 
measurements undertaken to protect the embedded systems. 
Keywords-embedded system security; mobile phone 
security; wireless sensor networks; autonomous vehicles; 
security unmanned aerial vehicles. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Embedded systems are purpose build computers that 
are designed to perform a specific function or a number of 
functions. These systems have a vital role in many 
applications such as manufacturing, commerce and are 
sometimes applied in mission critical applications. The 
embedded systems in electronic devices, such as tablets, 
smart phones, network routers, smart cards, and networked 
sensors, have become increasingly popular in recent years 
[1].  
The two main factors that allow attackers to target such 
systems are the complex nature of the embedded systems 
and their continuous connection with the Internet. 
Malicious users exploit vulnerabilities in embedded 
systems in order to steal important data, damage or disable 
the entire system. In the past, the number of attacks on 
embedded systems were limited by the fact that the 
systems were independent, but  has changed due to 
increased use of internet-connected devices [2]. The 
security of embedded systems has become a serious 
problem [3].  
 This paper surveys current research into the security of 
several specific embedded systems. We selected four types 
of embedded systems for our analysis security: mobile 
smart phones, wireless sensor networks, unmanned ground 
vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles. We selected these 
specific embedded systems due to their increasing 
importance: 
• Smart phones: these devices play a significant role 
in our daily lives, according to ABI Research, the 
number of attacks smart phones has increased by 
261% in the past two years [4]. 
• Wireless sensors: These devices are of interest 
because of their small size and their low power 
usage. They are easily placed in any environment, 
which makes them effective in monitoring both 
indoors and outdoors [5]. 
• Unmanned aerial vehicles: These are of interest 
because they have both national and international  
significance in aerial surveillance and monitoring, 
where they are increasingly considered more 
effective and successful than airplanes [6].  
• Unmanned ground vehicles: These robotic 
vehicles are of interest because they are effective 
in reducing human errors and saving passengers’ 
lives [7].  
It is important to identify the threats, vulnerabilities 
and attacks in order to determine the future security 
directions that can be used to protect embedded systems. 
The main objectives of this paper are: 
• Identifying the vulnerabilities of embedded 
systems. 
• Differentiating the types of attacks on the four 
types of embedded systems of interest. 
Exploring security mechanisms used to protect these 
systems. 
In Section II we will look at the current security 
properties of embedded systems, then, in Section III we 
will identify vulnerabilities and threats. In Section IV we 
will identify attack directions and in  Section V we will 
review possible security countermeasures for embedded 
systems. In Section VI we will present our conclusion. 
II. SECURITY PROPERTIES 
In general, security in  embedded systems must  
include the following three properties: confidentiality, 
integrity and the ability to authenticate [8]. Security should 
also prevent unauthorized access to the system or network. 
In this section, we briefly explain each property: 
Confidentiality refers to preventing attempts to eavesdrop 
on information by attackers. Integrity refers to  keeping 
data from alteration or illegal manipulation. Lastly, 
authentication serves to send and receive data securely 
only between the intended users. Moreover, another 
important feature of  security systems is keeping system 
resources available to users, some attackers seek to achieve 
a Denial of Services (DoS). Finally, a security system 
should have the ability of resisting to the system itself. 
Typically, attackers exploit the vulnerabilities instead of 
attacking the security system directly. 
III. VULNERABILITIES & THREATS 
We believe that all human-made systems contain 
vulnerabilities, which can potentially be exploited by 
attackers [9]. In order to provide an efficient security 
system that has the ability to protect the system, an 
analysis of potential attacks on embedded systems was 
undertaken. 
A. Vulnerabilities 
Embedded systems have several weaknesses which 
can lead to the loss or unintended capture of information, 
disruption, tampering or the destruction of the entire 
system. These vulnerabilities are [1]: 
• Energy drainage (exhaustion attack): The 
limitations on available energy in embedded 
systems is considered one of the weaknesses that 
can be exploited by attackers by "increasing the 
computational load, reducing sleep cycles, or 
increasing the use of sensors or other peripherals" 
[1]. 
• Physical intrusion (tampering): The proximity of 
the attacker to the embedded system can allow him 
to link to it directly by making power analysis 
attacks or snooping attacks on the bus system. 
• Network intrusion (malware attack): Networks in 
embedded systems are exposed to the same threat 
as traditional networks such as buffer overflow 
attacks. 
• Information theft (privacy violations): Data stored 
on the embedded systems is exposed to 
unauthorized access that leads to leaked data 
(cryptographic keys or electronic currency on 
smart cards). 
• Introduction of forged information (authenticity): 
This threat happens when the data fed to the  
systems is incorrect or is forged data, which gives 
inaccurate results (wrong video feeds in security 
cameras). 
• Confusing/damaging of sensors or other 
peripherals: Is similar to the introduction of 
incorrect data from the sensors or peripherals 
(tampering). 
• Thermal event (thermal virus or cooling system 
failure): Embedded systems need to operate in an 
ideal environment in terms of temperature (high 
temperature leads to damage). 
• Reprogramming systems for other purposes 
(stealing): Reprogramming embedded systems to 
change their  main function 
B. Threat Model 
Modelling threats is a security engineering activity to 
analyse threats to systems or applications in a systematic 
manner. The main goal of such modeling is to demonstrate 
that the threats are not obvious or hidden to the developer. 
This information serves to build a security strategy to 
protect systems and provide a roadmap for the future data 
security. By understanding and diagnosing potential risks 
to the systems, developers can  provide a smart way to 
manage these threats. Modelling threats is considered a 
powerful tool, because it does not specify simple 
vulnerabilities, but determines the actual threats against the 
systems. Embedded software presents a set of unique 
challenges for developers and designers in order to reduce 
or eliminate these threats. Some modelling techniques are 
static analysis, threat modelling  and penetration testing. 
Threats can be distinguished from vulnerabilities in 
terms of events. Threats are external events, which are 
designed to attack or breach the security system by 
exploiting vulnerabilities that are in the system. They can 
be resolved or overcome by finding alternative solutions to 
them, however, threats are constantly changing their 
approach to attack and steal highly important information 
or destroy the system through various malicious codes, 
viruses to deny the service. 
IV. ATTACKS DIRECTION 
The increased number of attacks on embedded systems 
is carried out either using a physical or logical means. 
Security approaches for these systems must cover multiple 
aspects: availability, user identification and security 
contents, storage, network access and communication [10]. 
Current traditional security systems, such as security 
protocols (IPSec and SSL) and cryptographic methods are 
unable to protect some embedded systems because their 
security systems constitute a kind of an extra burden to the 
systems, for example, overhead in processing time, data 
buffering and memory [1]. Attacks against embedded 
systems can be classified into two types according to their 
level of access to the system: 
A. Physical & Side channel attacks 
The attacker can access these devices directly using a 
physical connection. We have classified physical and side 
channel attacks into two main categories: invasive and 
non-invasive attacks. Invasive attacks include intervention 
or manipulation of the inside system such as [11,12]: 
1) Micro-probing: Analyzes the integrated circuits 
under the microscope.  
2) Reverse Engineering: Is used to understand the 
internal structure of the embedded systems and to learn or 
simulate their functions. 
Noninvasive attacks are attacks that do not need to 
access  the system from the inside. This type of attack is 
sophisticated and low effort compared to an invasive 
attack. There are a number of methods employed for this 
kind of attack [12]:  
   1) Timing analysis: attackers try to violate the 
cryptosystem by analyzing the time it takes to execute 
computations. [14,15]. 
   2) Power analysis: Attackers gather information by 
measuring the energy consumed. There are two ways to 
analyze, a simple power analysis (SPA) and differential 
power analysis (DPA) [16].  
   3) Electromagnetic analysis: The attacker can detect 
information by measuring the electromagnetic radiation 
emitted by the system [17]. 
4) Fault injection: this is a side channel attack and it is 
subdivided into different types [10,11]:  
• Latch-up: injects faults in embedded systems 
through a sudden change in voltage [18].  
• Round reduction reduces the number of rounds of 
encryption algorithms, this allows the attacker to 
extract the secret key as well as  reverse engineer 
the system [19]. 
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• Optical fault injection: a technique for changing 
the  random access memory by using the 
photoelectric effect [20]. 
• The Bellcore attack: an active attack that exploits 
incorrect computations in the derivation of the keys 
for any secret encryption protocols [21]. 
Side channel attacks are fairly straightforward to 
implement and can potentially allow attackers to steal 
confidential information and to leave without trace. 
Accordingly, security threats for embedded systems can 
be classified depending on the objectives or the manner of 
the attack [22].  
B.  Logical Attacks 
The attacker can penetrate the software or 
cryptographic security systems. Code injection attacks 
have become the predominant software attack [9], they are 
the injection of malicious code remotely through the 
network in order to exploit weakness in the systems 
application software. Cryptographic attackers exploit 
weaknesses in the cryptographic protocols (e.g. by 
guessing the password).  
Figure 1 shows common types of attacks on embedded 
systems:  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Fig. 1 Common types of attacks on embedded systems 
V. SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES FOR EMBEDDED 
SYSTEMS 
In the following sections, we list some common types 
of security countermeasures for embedded systems.    
Techniques to prevent code injection attacks have been 
divided into nine sets, based on the system components 
and techniques used in countermeasures [13]:  
a)  Architecture based countermeasures. 
b) Safe languages. 
c) Static code analyzers. 
d) Dynamic code analyzers. 
e) Anomaly detection techniques. 
f)  Sand boxing or damage containment approaches. 
g) Compiler support. 
h) Library support. 
i)  Operating system based countermeasures. 
There are many countermeasures against side-channel 
attacks [16, 23]: 
a) Masking. 
b) Window method. 
c) Dummy instruction insertion. 
d) Code/algorithm modification. 
e) Balancing. 
f)  Other methods such as (Randomization and 
Blinding). 
VI. ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURE IN EMBEDDED 
SYSTEMS 
A. Smart Phones 
One-sixth of the world uses smart mobile devices such 
as smart phones and tablets [24]. Smart phone devices are 
not only used for the purpose of conversation, but for 
surfing the Internet, sending and storing various data. This 
makes the devices easily exposed to attackers. These 
devices are supported by third-party applications, which 
helped to increase the number of attacks and the 
emergence of various threats such viruses, malware, 
worms and Trojan viruses [24]. Third-party applications 
are installed in the operating system of smart mobile 
devices, which play an important role in supporting a lot of 
entertainment applications and service programs. On the 
other hand, these applications have made mobile devices 
vulnerable to attacks [25]. 
Intrusion prevention mechanisms such as encryption 
and authentication are not sufficient to protect these 
devices against powerful attacks. Currently, intrusion 
detection systems are inappropriate for embedded systems 
or mobile systems due to their added power consumption 
and memory usage, and new low resource detection 
systems need to be investigated. 
1) Types of Attacks on Smart Phones 
Mobile phone devices are exposed to many types of 
attacks [25]: 
a) Malware: This type of attack is designed to reach 
the device secretly and without the consent of the owner. 
This type of attack prevents or impedes the use of the 
device through the exploitation of resources and alters or 
damages the user's data. 
b) Trojan Attackers: Trojans are common in 
computers nowadays and are used to transmit spam email 
to Internet users. This type of attack affects also mobile 
phones and often targets online banking and financial 
service data. 
c) Worm: This type of attack is self-replicating, 
destroys data and can target mobile applications, lunched 
from a Trojan attacker. 
We can classify the attacks of mobile phone into two 
types (depend on their operating systems): 
a) Cyber attacks: This type of attack allows hackers 
to access the information that is supposed to be encrypted 
on  operating systems [25]. Attackers can access the 
encrypted information and bypass the operating system by 
man-in-the-middle attacks.    
Malware attacks: this attack has a direct impact on the 
operating system [25]. This allows the attacker to erase and 
transfer all personal information available on mobile 
phones.    
2) Countermeasure Security 
Currently there are four steps to reduce or detect 
malicious code on mobile devices: 
a) Monitor: The amount of data traffic across the 
network [26]. 
b) Increase system defences: Which in turn reduces 
the possibility of installing malware attacks on the 
devices, by using such tools as sandboxes [25]. 
c) Develop admission control mechanisms: To these 
devices to make access difficult and only allow access 
through the use of trusted hardware [26]. 
d) Accessing: The file system of the mobile and 
scanning the data in the computer [26]. 
B. Wireless Sensor Network 
Security in wireless sensor networks is a very 
important issue as they are often deployed in mission 
critical environments with limited resources.  
Intrusion detection is a common method to defend the 
wireless sensor network, yet it is not an efficient one. A 
devastating attack in wireless sensor networks is the sleep 
deprivation attack, which leads to the depletion of power. 
The aim of this attack is to increase the power 
consumption of the target node, which leads to reduced 
battery life. Current studies on sleep deprivation attacker 
focused on mitigating the use of MAC based protocols 
such as S-MAC, T-MAC, B-MAC, etc. [5].  
Wireless sensor network refers to a system that consists 
of a set of nodes that have limited resources and low-cost 
work-sensing information from the external environment 
which can be sent to sink code. They include many 
applications, such as traffic and environmental monitoring, 
health care and military applications. However, wireless 
sensor networks are susceptible to a number of attacks 
such as jamming, battery drainage, routing cycle, Sybil and 
cloning. Due to the limited  energy resources, memory and 
computation of these sensor nodes, complex security 
mechanisms cannot be implemented. Therefore, it is 
important to find an efficient approach to protect  wireless 
sensor networks.  
Most attacks against the network layer of wireless 
sensor networks are: 
a)  Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing 
information 
b)  Selective forwarding 
c)  Sinkhole attacks 
d)  Sybil attacks 
e)  Wormholes 
f) HELLO flood attacks 
The DoS attacker can focus on the different layers of 
the network protocols: 
a)  Physical layer: this attack may be jamming and 
tampering. 
b) Link layer: this attack may be a collision, 
exhaustion and unfairness. 
c) Network layer: this attack may be neglected and 
greed, homing, misdirection and black holes 
d) Transport layer: this attack may be malicious 
flooding and desynchronization. 
C. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) have been exposed 
to several cyber-attacks over the past few years [27], since 
they lack countermeasures. A recent example is the capture 
of a US UAV  by Iranian forces, and the current view is 
that it was captured due to a weakness in the aircraft GPS 
system, which helped the attacker to take control of the 
plane [28]. A second theory is a crash landing of the UAV 
due to a technical malfunction [28]. Both theories assert 
that the problems are security challenges. Threats for the 
mission of UAVs are the connection to ground control, 
which  leaks sensitive data and in turn leads to loss of 
control.  
The quantity and quality of data carried by unmanned 
aircraft constitutes a rich target allowing the attacker to 
steal information or manipulate it, such was the loss of a 
Sentinel to Iranian military forces (RQ-170) in 4 Dec 2011 
[28] and  "the keylogging virus that infected the U.S. UAV 
fleet at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada in September 
2011” [29]. This shows us that the security measures in the 
past were not able to protect these UAVs. Solid protection 
mechanisms to protect against attacks must be developed.  
In this paper, we investigate recent attacks on the 
unmanned aircraft and develop a plan to assess the risks to 
this type of aircraft, depending on the infrastructure for 
communication. System designers try to minimize the 
vulnerabilities in the system that can be exploited by the 
attacker.  If the attacker cannot have physical access to the 
plane, they will try to reach it remotely. In this case, the 
attacker might exploit that this type of planes depend 
largely on external inputs and might not be able to get a 
reliable wireless connection to ground control. 
There are two types of communications for the UAV, 
namely [29]:  
a) Bidirectional information communication between 
the UAVs and ground control. 
   b) Communication with the external environment for 
the receipt of information from the sensors. 
1) Recent Attacks 
Recently, attacks can be classified into three types 
[30]:  
a)  Hardware Attack: In this type, attackers have the 
ability to access the components of the UAVs directly. 
b) Wireless Attack: In this type, attackers can achieve 
their attacks by using one of the wireless 
interfaces of the UAVs.  
c) Sensor Spoofing: In this type, attackers can 
transfer  false data to the UAVs through the on-
board sensors of the drone itself. 
2) Proactive Risk Assessment Scheme 
      Risk is evaluated based on the internal components of 
the UAV. The risk assessment depends on the type of 
security that we need to protect the UAV.  
a)       Although there are several security techniques 
applied in UAVs, we can observe through the recent 
attacks that these systems need  a stronger security systems 
to effectively repell attacks. 
D. Unmanned Groung Vehicles 
 In the past decade, mechanical components have been 
replaced by electronic components creating the so-called 
semi-autonomous vehicles. These vehicles contain more 
than 50 electronic control units (ECUs). The motivation 
for using autonomous vehicles is that they have a positive 
impact on people’s lives by improving the traffic flow and 
safeguarding the infrastructure from accidents. 
Most car companies are installing and updating the 
firmware in a traditional way, but the trend today is for 
updates to be installed and updated over the air, the so 
called firmware updates over the air (FOTA) [31]. This 
approach carries a lot of benefits, including: is more 
convenient for the customer and saves time, the update 
process is faster and improves safety [32]. Unfortunately, 
the development of this service was accompanied by 
external threats that target vehicles. Studies show that 
internal networks for vehicles do not have adequate 
protection systems against malicious attacks [32], and 
consequently, they will be easy to penetrate by attackers. 
1) Types of Attacks on Unmanned Vehicles 
Traditional attacks on vehicles are  physical attacks: 
Cutting break-wire or breaking the lock mechanism. The 
new technology (FOTA) has led to the emergence of 
vulnerabilities and new attacks such as cyber attacks. 
These attacks can install malicious programs that threaten 
the infrastructure of the vehicle and human life [32]. This 
attack has been designed to adapt to the limited 
possibilities of the hardware and software systems in 
intelligent vehicles. However, we need a mechanism to 
safeguard the integrity of the information sent to the 
firmware and prevent unauthorized access by attackers. 
Attacks have been classified as follows: indirect 
physical access, short range wireless access and long range 
(direct and indirect) wireless access [12]. 
a) Indirect Physical Access Attacks: This type 
focuses on a third-party attack that will attack the vehicle 
later. 
• OBD port: Attacker can use the diagnostic port to 
achieve his attack on the vehicle. The attacker can 
connect a pass-through device to the OBD port 
through the WiFi, which can achieve his attack 
remotely. Vulnerabilities in communications API 
enable the attacker to achieve his attack remotely 
(computer).  
• CD player: In this type, we can distinguish two 
vulnerabilities. First, the inclusion of a disk (CD) 
expected to contain the firmware updates, but in 
fact, it contains malicious code. Second, decoding 
the WMA file, this helps to broadcast messages 
over the bus for the internal network. 
• USB port: vehicle media player can access a 
corrupted file stored on a USB key. This type 
brings other attacks through smart mobile devices 
b) Short Range Attacks: Attacks using short-range 
wireless networks. This attack can constitute a direct 
attack by targeting the vehicle's communication, or 
indirectly through the driver's devices that are usually 
connected to the vehicle such as smart phones. 
• Wireless pairing of mobile devices: Modern 
vehicles are likely to be coupled with mobile 
devices. For example, a driver connects their 
mobile phone with the vehicle via Bluetooth.  
• Car-to-car communications: Communication 
between the vehicle and another vehicle is very 
important in the exchange of information or 
between vehicle and infrastructure. The attacker 
can eavesdrop on the exchange or send fake data. 
• Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS): This 
consists of pressure sensors inside tires by which 
the data are sent to an electronic control unit via 
radio frequency emitter. The attacker can 
eavesdrop on these signals and send false signals 
from 40 meters to the electronic control unit and 
trigger a spark alarm light. 
• Wireless unlocking: A lot of vehicles have the 
technology to open their doors remotely. These 
signals are encrypted and transmitted through the 
air.    
c) Long-range Direct Attacks: This type of attack is   
implemented via remote control. 
• Telephony: detection of several vulnerabilities in 
the telematic unit. Some of the attacks are done 
over the 3G network.  
• Web browsing: vehicles have a web browser that 
creates a gateway for the injection of malware. 
d) Long-range Indirect Attacks: This kind of attack is  
indirectly remote controlled. 
• App store: owner of a vehicle using an app store 
to download some programs, which are can be 
harmful due because they expose the vehicle to 
attacks such as Trojans.   
Side channel triggers: Broadcast signals of a certain 
Radio Data System (RDS) constitutes a danger to the 
electronic control units. 
2) Security Countermeasures 
Encryption systems are considered one of the most 
effective protection for these systems from attacks. There 
has been a number of security counter measurements 
applied on Unmanned Vehicles such as cryptography, 
software integrity and anomaly detection. Control Area 
Networks (CAN) are employ as internal networks in cars. 
These networks do not support unique Electronic Control 
Unit (ECU) as transmitters or receivers. Hence, it is 
difficult to know where the message was generated or 
received. Therefore, traditional intruder detection systems 
cannot be applied on similar internal networks of semi-
autonomous vehicles. It is however possible to apply them 
to the gateway of the internal networks. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The security of embedded systems is a very important 
issue that designers and programmers must take into  
consideration. The importance of security systems is in 
their application in critical infrastructure exposed to many 
attacks as well as to minimize the weaknesses that made 
embedded systems easy to penetrate. We elaborated on 
four types of embedded systems and security measures for 
them as well as the type of attacks directed at these 
systems. We concluded that these systems require 
sophisticated protection systems that can prevent or reduce 
the number of attacks. Finally, through our investigati of 
the vulnerabilities of embedded systems, and recognizing , 
the different threats, future work on security systems can 
be customized to the specific characteristics of embedded 
ssystems 
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